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European Central Bank working paper series 57Abstract 
This paper explores the reasons why an increasing number of firms in continental Europe are 
unifying their shares into a single class, and analyzes the consequences of this restructuring. 
Interestingly, recent changes in corporate governance environment have created a situation when 
the reasons that once caused the introduction of dual -class shares, i.e., the need to issue new 
equity and to defend firm from a possible takeover, are the same that now motivate firms to 
switch back to one share-one vote. Meanwhile, higher value of control rights (e.g., high 
separation between control and cash flow rights) significantly reduces the likelihood of 
unification. Finally, the data show that firm value increases after the unification. 
 
JEL Classification: G32; G34 
Key words: corporate governance; dual-class shares; one share-one vote 
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Non-technical summary 
The term dual-class shares means that the firm has more than one share class with 
different voting rights attached to them. This structure allows shareholders to achieve a 
controlling position by investing unproportionally low share of capital. For example, one investor 
may own 20 percent of the share capital, but control 50 percent of the voting rights. Such an 
asymmetry between cash flow and voting rights can create a negative effect when those in control 
have incentives to divert corporate resources at the expense of other shareholders. As a result, 
corporate valuation can decrease, cost of capital increase, and a firm can face investment 
constraints (La Porta et al. (1997, 2002), and Claessens et al. (2002)). On the other hand, there is 
a fair amount of theoretical and empirical evidence showing that, under certain conditions, dual-
class share structure can benefit shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Fischel (1987), 
Burkart et al. (1998), and Dimitrov and Jain (2003)).  
There is extensive literature (e.g., Partch (1987), Jarrel and Poulsen (1988), and Millon-
Cornett and Vetsuypens (1989)) documenting the effects of introduction of dual-class structures. 
However, recently there is an increasing tendency for firms to give up the multiple classes of 
shares. The literature on this recent type of restructuring has so far been limited. This paper 
contributes to it by exploring the firms’ incentives to unify the shares with different voting rights 
into a single share class, as well as the consequences of this restructuring.  
Theoretical arguments for unification are as follows. Firms with weaker shareholder 
protection have lower valuations because investors take into account that some of the profits can 
be diverted (Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)). The market participants tend to believe that the 
profit diversion can be more prevalent in dual -class firms than in single-class firms; therefore 
they pay less for the former. The unification is hence a way to increase the firm’s market 
valuation by commiting to reduce the potential profit diversion, increasing liquidity, and 
improving investor recognition by making shares available to a wider pool of investors.  
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The paper presents empirical evidence using data from 493 publicly traded firms in seven 
European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) 
where dual-class share structures are widely used. The results show that firms that are dependent 
on new equity capital, make more acquisitions of other companies, and have a controlling 
shareholder with lower private benefits of control are more likely to unify their shares. The 
interpretation of these results is that low share value is not much of a concern – the minority 
shareholders pay a fair price taking into account the potential profit diversion – unless firm wants 
to do any transactions with stock.  
As a consequence of the unification, the market value and sales growth of the firm goes 
up if compared to the firm itself before the unification. Meanwhile, comparing firms with similar 
growth opportunities, the firms that unify their shares experience higher market value, but no 
difference in sales growth compared to other dual-class firms. These results imply that the dual-
class share structure per se does not preclude firms from growth unless the firms depend on 
equity capital. In this context, the paper gives some implications for the recent policy debate on 
whether dual-class share structures should be forbidden. The answer is no. The evidence shows 
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Introduction 
Firms with dual -class shares
1 are rather common in Europe (Faccio and Lang (2002)), and in 
many countries around the world, including the United States. A growing literature emphasizes 
that the asymmetry between cash flow and voting rights created by dual-class ownership allows 
the controlling parties to receive a disproportionate amount of corporate benefits, the so called 
private benefits
2 (Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988)). As a result, corporate 
valuation can decrease, cost of capital increase, and a firm may face investment constraints (La 
Porta et al. (1997, 2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003)). On the other 
hand, there is a fair amount of theoretical and empirical work showing that, under certain 
conditions, dual-class shares can benefit shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Fischel 
(1987), Burkart et al. (1998), and Dimitrov and Jain (2003)).  
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show theoretically that firms with weaker shareholder 
protection have lower valuations because investors take into account that some of the profits can 
be diverted. If market participants believe that profit diversion is more prevalent in dual -class 
firms than in single-class firms, they will pay less for the former. We call it dual -class 
“equilibrium”: controlling shareholders enjoy the private benefits, and minority shareholders pay 
for what they get – the expected cash flow after the extraction of such private benefits. This begs 
the question of why, suddenly, some dual-class companies choose to deviate from this 
equilibrium.  
This paper studies the determinants of the decision to unify the shares with different 
voting rights (high voting shares and low voting shares) into a single share class. Throughout the 
paper, I refer to this event as the unification. The factors driving the probability of unification are 
inferred both from ex-ante and ex-post characteristics of the companies that unified their shares. 
The main prediction is that the goal of the unification is to take advantage of an increased market 
value. The market value is expected to increase after the unification for several reasons. First, the 
unification is a commitment to reduce the potential profit diversion. Second, the liquidity should 
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go up with improved firm-level corporate governance (Brockman and Chung (2003)). Finally, the 
unification can improve investor recognition. Shares become available to a wider pool of 
investors, which according to Merton (1987) improves the share value.  
 The determinants of the unification are explored using a panel data set of 493 publicly 
traded firms in seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland) where dual-class share structures are widely used. A total of 108 of the firms 
unified the dual-class shares in the period 1996-2002. I call these firms the event group. The other 
385 firms remained dual-class within the same period. I call these firms the control group.   
Using different model specifications, the results strongly confirm the hypotheses that the 
firms that are dependent on new equity capital, make more acquisitions of other companies, and 
have a controlling shareholder with lower private benefits of control are more likely to unify their 
shares. The interpretation of these results is that low share value is not much of a concern – the 
minority shareholders pay a fair price taking into account the potential expropriation – unless the 
firm wants to do any transactions with stock. The likelihood of the unification decreases 
substantially if the firm’s controlling shareholder enjoys high private benefits of control. I show 
that all the variables that proxy for the level of private benefits have the expected signs and are 
significant. In particular, the event firms are characterized by: a) a smaller difference between the 
votes and cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder, b) a more frequent presence of a 
financial investor, and c) a higher number of firms cross-listed in the U.S. With low private 
benefits for the incumbent, the dual-class share system imposes a risk that a raider with high 
private benefits may appear and cheaply acquire control. I present some evidence that the 
unification can be a way to prevent such takeovers. 
The prediction that the unification is intended to increase the market value of a firm can 
be tested alternatively from the ex-post consequences of the unification. The results suggest that 
firms indeed reach their goal of increasing the market value, and the effect is rather persistent. 
The difference between the firm’s market-to-book ratio and the respective average ratio of single 
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class firms in the same industry jumps from around –0.5 to 0 in the year of the unification. In 
other words, the ex-dual-class firm achieves the same value as an average single-class firm in the 
industry. The paper presents interesting evidence that a firm that unifies its dual-class shares 
experiences increased market value and sales growth after the unification compared to the firm 
itself before the unification. However, comparing firms with similar growth opportunities, the 
event firms experience higher market values and lower leverage, but no difference in sales growth 
compared to other dual-class firms. This result suggests that the dual-class share structure per se 
does not preclude firms from growth unless the firms depend on equity capital. 
This paper relates to a broader literature on dual-class shares: the value of control 
measured by the voting premium (Bergström and Rydqvist (1990, 1992), Nenova (2003), etc.), 
the IPO under-pricing in dual-class firms (Smart and Zutter (2003)), the dual -class share 
introductions, the switch from a single to dual -class share structure (e.g., Partch (1987), Jarrel and 
Poulsen (1988), Millon-Cornett and Vetsuypens (1989)), and the effect of certain policy changes 
on dual -class firms (Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995), Robinson et al. (1996), Hoffmann-
Burchardi (1999), Bennedsen and Nielsen (2002), and Berglöf and Burkart (2003)).  
In the existing literature, a fair amount of effort has already been spent documenting the 
effects of introduction of dual-class structures. However, with firms shedding the multiple classes 
of shares in recent years, it is useful to understand the incentives to do so, as well as the 
consequences. This paper addresses those goals. Three closely related studies that consider the 
unification of shares in a single country are Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) for Canada, Hauser 
and Lauterbach (2003) for Israel, and Dittmann and Ulbricht (2003) for Germany. This paper 
differs from previous studies in several respects. It is the first cross-country study. A larger 
sample used in this paper allows to find more precise matches for the event firms, and to detect 
the differences in firm characteristics. Most importantly, this study explores not only the 
determinants of the unification but also the ex-post consequences of it. To my knowledge, this is 
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the first paper that explores firm characteristics after the unification, and explicitly documents the 
effect on firm valuation beyond a short term announcement effect. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents related literature, anecdotal evidence, 
and institutional background concerning the unification of shares. Section II introduces the 
hypotheses and empirical model. Data and summary statistics are provided in Section III. Section 
IV analyzes the ex-ante determinants of the unification decision. Section V studies the ex-post 
consequences of the unification, and Section VI concludes. 
 
In this section, I present the empirical evidence on dual-class share structures and the 
anecdotal evidence on why companies do the unification. I also discuss recent institutional 
changes affecting the firms with dual -class share structure.  
 
A. Related literature 
Before presenting the evidence on the unification of dual-class shares, it is instructive to 
discuss the opposite event, namely the introduction of dual-class shares. The major reasons for 
introducing the dual-class share structure are to prevent the dilution of control and to provide an 
effective defense against hostile takeover (e.g., Partch (1987) and Smith and Amoako-Adu 
(1991)). Even though these reasons raise concerns about adverse wealth effects, it has been 
shown that market reaction to introduction of dual-class shares is not necessarily negative (Partch 
(1987) and Millon-Cornett and Vetsuypens (1989)). Grossman and Hart (1988) show 
theoretically that deviations from one share-one vote may sometimes increase market value if 
both incumbent and rival have substantial private benefits, and the party with high private 
benefits also has high security benefits. In this case, minority shareholders are better off if 
dividend rights and voting rights are separated because the winning party in a takeover has to pay 
also for the expected private benefits. Instead, when private benefits of either incumbent or rival 
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I. Evidence on the unification of dual-class shares  
are small, Grossman and Hart (1988) show that one share-one vote is generally optimal. Burkart 
et al. (1998) present a model in which the presence of takeover costs creates a trade-off between a 
higher likelihood of tender offers and more efficient tender offers. They show that the dual-class 
share system is optimal if the benefits of a higher likelihood of tender offers outweigh the costs of 
less efficient tender offers.  
As opposed to the introduction of dual-class shares, the switch to one share-one vote is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Three related empirical papers consider the abolition of dual-class 
share structure. Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) find that the most common factors leading 56 
firms on the Toronto Stock Exchange to eliminate dual-class equity were to meet the terms of a 
debt restructuring agreement, to facilitate the sale of a control block, and to increase institutional 
appeal for stock prior to a seasoned offering. These factors are derived from the statements made 
by the companies. Using data on 67 Israeli stock unifications, Hauser and Lauterbach (2003) 
estimate the value of voting rights from compensation paid on high voting shares for giving up 
some of the votes. All the Israeli unifications soared after the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange 
introduced a new regulation (in 1989) which banned new issues of low voting shares. With this 
regulation, firms that wanted to raise new equity were effectively forced to unify the dual-class 
shares. Using data on 31 unification of shares in Germany, Dittmann and Ulbricht (2003) find that 
a company is more likely to abolish the dual-class structure if the expected future growth is high, 
if the firm is large, or if the largest block of voting shares is small. They find that the reaction of 
non-voting shares to the announcement of share unification is significantly positive, the reaction 
of voting shares is weakly positive, and the reaction of the full market capitalization is 
significantly positive.  
Ironically, one of the main reasons (found in all the three previous studies) why dual-
class companies are unifying their share structure is to pave the way for new equity issues, which 
is the same as one of the reasons why companies introduced a multiple share structure to begin 
with (Partch (1987) and Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001)). What has changed in the period from 
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mid 80s to late 90s? One of the factors is the change in fashion. In 1984, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) undertook a revaluation of its policy (introduced in 1957) not to list companies 
with dual -class share structure. The discrimination of dual-class shares on NYSE ceased to exist 
in 1986.
3 This step improved the marketability of dual-class shares. The increased reorganizations 
of corporate voting rights was also common in response to the takeover boom of the 1980s. In 
recent years, the fashion has arguably changed. In the aftermath of Enron and other corporate 
governance scandals, anything that can potentially increase the managerial entrenchment becomes 
suspicious. The popularity of dual-class shares, one of the most obvious and visible tools for 
increasing managerial (or large shareholder) entrenchment, has been adversely affected. As a 
result, the companies that need to approach the investors for new capital are the ones that cannot 
afford to be out of fashion.  
 
B. Anecdotal evidence 
An obvious question arises of what companies themselves say about the unification, why 
they do it. Table I presents a brief summary of statements made by several of the companies that 
unified their shares. The table shows that companies believe that the unification would increase 
share value and liquidity, augment investor recognition, allow to pay for acquisitions using stock, 
support growth, enhance financial flexibility, and defend takeover. The last argument (made by 
Nokia), to defend takeover, again is the same as one of the main arguments why dual-class shares 
were introduced. Nokia (before the unification) had developed into a company with dispersed 
ownership structure and high foreign investor presence, with presumably low private benefits for 
incumbents. In this situation, allowing an outside rival with high private benefits to acquire 
control cheaply can have negative wealth effects (Grossman and Hart (1988)). 
 The arguments for increasing investor recognition can be (subjectively) divided into 
“rational” and “not-so-rational” ones. The rational arguments, for example, (16) and (17), state 
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that the dual-class shares are not available to certain investor groups (in particular, investment 
funds) due to legal restrictions. The arguments summarized under “not-so-rational” ones suggest 
that the company believes that the investor base is lower because the dual-class firms are not 
familiar to certain investor groups (mostly, foreign investors), which “do not understand this 
division of shares”. Statement (20) is very close to the idea that investors tend to invest in certain 
categories of shares (Barberis and Shleifer (2003)). In this case, the company believes that there is 
a disadvantage of being in the “Not Luxus category with two share classes”.  
Statement (20) points towards the competition for capital story. When there is an 
increasing number of single-class shares around, a dual-class firm can find it more difficult to 
attract investors. This statement corroborates the view that the companies that are looking for new 
equity capital have to follow the market trends. 
 
C. Institutional changes 
Even though in neither of the sample countries the unification of shares has been 
compulsory, there have been certain changes in corporate governance legislation  in the sample 
period (1996-2002). Panel B of Table II shows that the number of newly listed dual-class shares 
has decreased substantially in the recent years, which indirectly puts pressure on existing dual -
class companies. What can explain this downturn?  
According to Grossman and Hart (1988), dual-class shares may be optimal if both 
incumbent and raider have high private benefits of control, otherwise, one share-one vote is 
optimal. In recent years, there have been numerous legal reforms aimed at improving investor 
protection (see Appendix A). The legal reforms have evidently reshaped the type of potential 
buyers in takeovers, and hence reduced the optimality of dual-class share system.  
  Shares with low voting rights in many countries (e.g., Germany and Italy) carry 
preferential dividend rights. With decreasing bank loan interest rates, a minimum dividend of e.g. 
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5% of the par value of low voting shares may have become too expensive to maintain. This 
imposes additional cost on the dual-class share structure. In many countries, particularly in 
Europe, the regulations impose that a rights offering method
4 is the default method of a seasoned 
equity offering (other methods may require almost unanimous approval from all the share 
classes). Continuing to pay high preferential dividend on newly issued low voting shares or 
giving the holders of low voting shares a right to buy high voting shares might become too costly.  
  Several countries have restricted the inclusion of non-voting shares in the major stock 
indices. For example, DAX and M-DAX in Germany and MIB30 and MIDEX in Italy, since 
recent, allow only voting shares to be included in the index. For liquidity reasons, this puts dual-
class companies at a disadvantage. Most of the “new markets” introduced in the recent years, 
such as Neuer Markt in Germany and Nuovo Mercato in Italy, forbid the listing of non-voting 
shares. This restriction has clearly reduced the popularity of dual-class shares among “new 
economy” companies.  
   
D. Summary 
  The costs of dual-class share structure have increased in the recent years due to investor 
focus on better corporate governance practices. The previous empirical results and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the unification can increase the market value of a firm. The increasing 
costs of dual-class share structure put a considerable burden on companies that need to raise new 
equity capital and hence care about their share price, liquidity, and investor recognition.  
 
II. Hypotheses and empirical model 
In this section, I present a more formal discussion on what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of the unification from a controlling shareholder’s perspective. It is implicitly 
assumed that the controlling shareholder or a manager acting in the interests of this shareholder is 
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the main decision maker. To approve the unification, it has to be individually rational for the 
main decision maker. 
 
A. Hypotheses 
Theoretically, the total market value of a company should increase after the unification 
because the cost of capital decreases due to higher liquidity, wider investor base, and lower risk of 
expropriation. Previous research has shown that liquidity is significantly positively affected by 
investor protection (Brockman and Chung (2003)), hence the liquidity should increase after the 
unification. Higher liquidity should reduce the firm’s cost of capital and increase it’s market value 
(e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986)). There is evidence that companies may have a narrower 
investor base when outside investors feel less protected (Giannetti and Simonov (2004)). There 
are also legal restrictions precluding certain institutional investors of holding dual -class shares. 
The stocks of these companies can be undervalued because of the lack of risk sharing (Merton 
(1987)). It has been shown both theoretically and empirically that the risk of expropriation 
(entrenchment) is higher in firms that separate ownership from control (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002) and Claessens et al. (2002)), in particular so if the private benefits of an outside rival in a 
takeover are substantially lower than the private benefits of an incumbent (Grossman and Hart 
(1988)).
5 As a result, the market value of dual-class firms can be lower than that of similar single-
class firms.
6  
 Although the market value of the firm is expected to increase after the unification, it does 
not mean that all the parties gain equally and would accept the unification. The market value 
represents only the security benefits, while we know that the controlling shareholder can receive 
also private benefits of control, which can decrease substantially after the unification. Moreover, 
the wealth effects on high and low voting shares can be different. The two classes of shares can 
differ with respect to dividends, liquidity, and voting rights. In some firms (e.g., as set by law in 
Germany and Italy) low voting shares receive preferential dividends. Typically, high voting 
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shares are less liquid than low voting shares (see e.g. Nenova (2003)), because large part of these 
shares can be hold in a block and not traded or these shares are not listed at all. The valuations of 
high and low voting shares differ if there is some value attached to the voting rights. The value of 
voting rights may represent the expected premium that an outside raider may offer to acquire 
control over firm’s decisions (Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983), Stulz (1988), and 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)). When there is a takeover attempt, a higher price may be paid 
for a high voting share because it carries more votes. As a result, after the unification, low voting 
shares gain voting rights and loose preferential dividends (if there are any), while high voting 
shares can gain on dividends (as their dividends are not any more subordinated to low voting 
shares) and liquidity, but loose on voting rights. Previous evidence shows that the share price on 
low voting shares increases more than on high voting shares when a company announces the 
unification (Dittmann and Ulbricht (2003)). Further on, I assume that the price of low voting 
shares (for simplicity, they are non-voting shares) increases, while the price of voting shares 
decreases after the unification. This is a more restrictive case which makes it harder for the 
controlling shareholder to accept the unification.  
For simplicity, I consider unifications without any compensation for high voting 
shareholders, i.e., where all the shares are converted into shares with one vote per share. As a 
result, after the unification high voting shareholders have the same fraction of cash flow rights, 
but lower fraction of votes than before the unification. In practice, only 9 firms in my sample 
(predominantly in Italy and Norway) compensate the loss of voting rights with additional stocks 
or cash.
7 The compensation would arguably make the unification more attractive to the 
controlling shareholders, but it can face strong opposition from the low voting shareholders. 
Moreover, the decision about the compensation is of a second-order after the proposal to unify the 
shares has been made.
8 
Consider a simple example. Assume the share capital of a firm consists of 50 voting 
shares (one vote per share) and 50 non-voting shares, with controlling shareholder holding 20 
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voting shares and 20 non-voting shares. This means that the controlling shareholder has 40% of 
votes (20/50) and 40% of cash flow rights ((20+20)/(50+50)). Also assume that the price of one 
voting share before the unification (P
v) is 1.10, the price of one non-voting share (P
nv) is 0.90, and 
the price of a unified (single) share after the unification (? ) is 1.05. Given these assumptions, the 
unification would increase the controlling shareholder’s security benefits by (20+20)*1.05 – 
(20*1.10 + 20*0.90) = 2. If the decrease in private benefits is lower than 2, the controlling 
shareholder is better off by unifying the shares. Now assume that the controlling shareholder 
holds the same 20 voting shares, but none of the non-voting shares, in other words, 40% of votes 
and 20% of cash flow rights. The unification is clearly value decreasing for the controlling 
shareholder as the security benefits decrease by 1. Thus, we obtain 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of unification should increase if the controlling shareholder has a 
smaller difference between control and cash flow rights.   
The likelihood of unification should also increase if the expected decrease in private 
benefits after the unification is low. Since measuring the expected decrease in private benefits is 
difficult, we can assume that the loss of private benefits after the unification should be lower if 
the controlling shareholder had low private benefits to start with. Consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence in the previous section, low private benefits of the incumbent also suggest that the 
unification can be used as a tool to defend a takeover by a rider with high private benefits. If the 
benefits of more efficient tender offers outweigh the costs of lower likelihood of tender offers, the 
unification is optimal (Burkart et al. (1998)). Overall, these arguments suggest 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of unification should increase if the private benefits accruing to the 
controlling shareholder are low. 
Measuring private benefits of control is not trivial. In addition to the difference between control 
and cash flow rights, one of the proxies used in the previous studies is the type of the controlling 
shareholder. Financial investors can have lower incentives for private benefit extraction (see e.g., 
McConnell and Servaes (1990)), and hence increase the likelihood of unification. Reese and 
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Weisbach (2002) and Doidge (2003) argue that cross-listing in the U.S. is a bonding mechanism 
that improves the protection afforded to minority investors and decreases the private benefits of 
control.
9 Following this reasoning, we should expect that the dual-class firms which are cross-
listed in the U.S., other things equal, are more likely to unify their shares.  
The importance of security benefits becomes important if the controlling shareholder 
plans to sell the shares, and if the new shareholder has lower private benefits of control, in which 
case the full value of control benefits can not be retrieved. If this is the case, we should expect to 
see a change of controlling shareholder after the unification. 
Hypothesis 3: The controlling shareholder’s cash-flow stake should decrease substantially after 
the unification. 
Following the discussion in the previous section, we argued that the market sentiment 
towards dual-class shares is particularly important for firms that need to raise new equity capital. 
Let us consider this argument from the controlling shareholder’s perspective. Keeping all the 
other assumptions intact, assume that the controlling shareholder has 30 voting shares and 10 
non-voting shares (60% of votes, and 40% of equity). Without a need to issue new equity, the 
unification would not be accepted because the controlling shareholder’s security benefits are 42 
under both current and proposed share structure. Considering there is even a very small decrease 
in private benefits, the unification is value destroying. Now assume there is a positive net present 
value (NPV) project that needs to be financed with equity. The project requires investment of 20, 
which would increase the security benefits by 30. This can be regarded as a new investment 
project within a company or an acquisition of another company. 
If the firm issues new equity through a rights offering under the current share structure, 
each shareholder receives the rights to acquire new shares proportional to his existing stake and 
existing share price. The security value to the controlling shareholder is equal to the current 
security value (42) plus the net benefit from new investment project (3.6), which gives the total 
value of 45.6. The net benefit from new investment is less than 4 (=0.4*NPV) because the 
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benefits of the new project are shared according to the equity participation while the costs are 
shared according to the current market price of the shares. Since the controlling shareholder has 
more voting than non-voting shares, his share of project costs is higher than on average. 
Alternatively, if the share unification is carried out before the new equity issue, the security value 
to the controlling shareholder would be 42 (=40*1.05) plus 4 (=0.4*10), which is 46. If the 
change in private benefits after the unification is lower than 0.4, the controlling shareholder is 
better off by unifying the dual-class shares before issuing new shares. Thus I propose 
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of unification should increase if the firm plans to issue new equity. 
Hypothesis 5: The likelihood of unification should increase if the firm plans to make acquisitions 
of other companies. 
Hypothesis 4 is related to Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002) who find that the firms that issued dual-
class shares at the IPO stage are less likely to return to capital markets for seasoned equity 
offerings. In addition to positive market reaction due to reasons mentioned before, the firms with 
planned new equity issues can gain from positive publicity around the unification event. The 
switch to one share-one vote is boldly regarded as a step towards improved corporate governance, 
and typically gets significant media attention.
10  
Firms with better growth opportunities, in general, should have higher incentives to unify 
the shares. Even if a firm is not issuing new equity right after the unification, it may need to raise 
substantial amount of capital for investments and expansion in the future. Simplifying the share 
structure can make the process easier. Moreover, firms with higher growth opportunities 
(combined with lower financial flexibility) are more likely to become takeover targets. Hence, 
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of unification should be higher in firms with high growth 
opportunities. 
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B. Empirical design  
Here, I present the main model specifications for testing the predictions about the 
probability of unification and the likely consequences of it. Alternative model specifications and 
robustness checks are left for Section IV and V. 
To test the hypotheses concerning the likelihood of unification (ex-ante effects), I 
estimate a pooled probit model  controlling for year and country effects: 
Pr(Unifyit=1) = F(aZit),                 (1) 
where Unifyit is a variable that equals one if the company i switched to a single-class share system 
in year t and zero if it remained dual-class in this year (a firm is dropped from the sample after it 
unifies the shares), F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable, and 
Zit is a vector of explanatory variables. 
The consequences of unification (ex-post effects) are tested using fixed-effects 
regressions in which the effect of unification is captured by dummy variables for the year of the 
unification and the three subsequent years (as in Pagano et al. (1998)): 
yit=a+UNIt+UNIt-1+UNIt-2+UNIt-3+u i+dt+eit,         (2) 
where yit is the variable of interest (e.g., SALES GROWTH) in firm i in year t, ui and dt are 
respectively a firm-specific and calendar year-specific effect, UNIt-j are dummy variables equal to 
one if year t-j was the year of the unification. In this model, a firm before the unification is used 




The main sample for empirical investigation consists of 493 companies in seven 
European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). The 
sample covers all European countries in which dual -class firms are frequent (see Nenova (2003)). 
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The seven European countries use different types of dual-class shares (see Appendix A), but the 
basic principle is the same: one share class gives higher voting rights than the other thus allowing 
separation between cash flow ownership and control. In all the sample countries, both share 
classes are treated equally for tax purposes, i.e., there is no tax advantage on low voting shares as, 
for example, is the case of bank issued trust preferred stock in the U.S., and the low voting shares 
are not required to be convertible into high voting shares as it is the case in the Netherlands. 
A sample firm complies with the following criteria: The firm is present in Moody’s/ 
Mergent International Company Database (1996-2002 Manuals), is not a commercial bank or 
credit institution (SIC codes 60 and 61), had a dual-class share structure at the end of 1995, and is 
still listed on the stock exchange at the end of 2002. The sample construction is presented in 
Panel A of Table III. Out of 601 firm that satisfied all the above criteria except the last one, for 
various reasons we drop 108 firms. Ten percent of firms were taken over or merged with another 
firm. The characteristics of these firms will be discussed in Section IV.C. Four percent of firms 
were delisted because the ownership became too concentrated (no or very little free float). Other 
four percent of firms were dropped due to data unavailability. It leaves us 493 firms (82%). Out 
of this sample, 108 firms (22%) now have single share class (event group), and 385 firms (78%) 
still have dual-class shares (control group). If we compare the number of unifications with the 
total initial dual -class firm sample (including the firms that dropped out during 1996-2002), the 
event group represents 18%. These numbers show that the unification is an important event 
among the dual-class shares and the market in whole.  
Panel B of Table III tracks the initial sample of dual -class firms by country. The lowest 
unification activity has been in Sweden, where only five percent of the initial sample (7 out of 
136 firms) switched to one share-one vote. In Denmark, the respective number is 11% (10 out of 
88 firms). The highest unification activity has been in Norway, Germany, and Switzerland (30%, 
29%, and 25%, respectively). It is interesting to note that Sweden and Denmark have the highest 
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fraction of mergers and takeovers among dual-class firms. In Sweden, 18% of the initial sample 
of dual-class firms (25 out of 136 firms) merged or were taken over during 1996-2002. Panel C of 
Table III shows that the number of unifications has been increasing over sample years: from 8 
events per year in 1996 to 23 in 2000 and 2001. The highest number of unifications is observed in 
Germany (41 firm) and Switzerland (26 firms). Panel D of Table III shows the industry 
breakdown of the main sample of 493 companies. We observe that the highest number of dual -
class firms is in Capital goods and Food and Tobacco industry (84 and 74 firms, respectively), 
while the lowest number is in Basic industry (4 firms). With the exception of Basic industry, the 
unifications are rather homogeneously spread across all the industry groups. 
Panel A of Table II shows that the fraction of dual-class firms among all firms has 
decreased since 1995, but it is still substantial at the end of 2001. The largest fraction of dual-
class firms is in Sweden (46%), and the lowest in Norway (7%) and Germany (11%). We should 
note that there are large and important market players among the dual-class firms. The event 
group consists of mainly large and medium size companies, including such famous names as, for 
example, ABB, Lufthansa, and Nokia. The control group includes, for example, BMW, 
Carlsberg, Ericsson, and Fiat. 
Panel B of Table II presents evidence that the fraction of dual-class firms among newly 
listed domestic companies has been steadily decreasing from 22% in 1996 to only 4% in 2002. 
Sweden appears as a striking outlier; 71% of all new dual-class listings in seven sample countries 
during 1996-2002 happened in Sweden.  
B. Summary statistics 
Table IV contains summary statistics for 3451 firm-years: 493 companies and seven 
years (1996-2002). The number of observations vary due to data availability constraints. The first 
group until the dividing line presents variables with annual data, while the second group shows 
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data that are assumed constant over sample years. All the variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix B.  
The main data sources used in this study are as follows. Financial data is from 
Worldscope. Information on different share class characteristics (voting power, dividend rights, 
listing, etc.) comes from Moody’s/ Mergent International Company Database, Datastream, 
company annual reports, and Lexis-Nexis. Ownership data are from Faccio and Lang (2002), 
Sunding and Sundqvist (1995-2001), and company annual reports. Data source for acquisitions is 
Securities Data Corporation Platinum database.  
Panel A of Table IV shows that the median firm in the whole sample has a market-to-
book (MTB) ratio of 1.53, an industry adjusted market-to-book ratio of –0.98, a size (log of sales) 
of 5.54, capital expenditures of 19% of net property, plant, and equipment, and annual sales 
growth of 6%. In terms of ownership structure, the median firm in the sample has the largest 
shareholder with 44% of votes (control) and 25% of cash flow rights (ownership). Forty percent 
of all firms have only one of the share classes listed on the stock exchange, 11% of firms have 
their shares cross-listed in the U.S., 41% of firms have a family as the largest shareholder, and 
11% of firms have a financial institution as the largest shareholder.  
In Panel B and Panel C of Table IV, the summary statistics are presented separately for 
the event group, and the control group. In Panel B, the statistical significance of the univariate 
analysis between the event group and the control group variables is shown. The firms that 
switched to a single share class compared to other dual-class firms are characterized by higher 
market-to-book ratios, larger size, higher number and size of new equity issues, and higher 
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IV. Ex-ante determinants of unification 
In this section, the firm characteristics which increase the likelihood of unification are 
estimated. First, the results using the main model specification (pooled probit) are presented. 
Second, alternative methods are used as a robustness check. Finally, I present the evidence from 
takeovers of dual-class firms. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
A. Main model 
Table V reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model, as well as the 
standard errors, using a fully robust variance-matrix estimator that allows for within-cluster (firm) 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. The robust estimator assumes for no particular kind of within-
cluster correlation nor a particular form of heteroskedasticity. This specification relaxes the 
independence assumption required by the probit estimator to being just the independence between 
the clusters (firms). This specification yields very similar results to random-effects regression (not 
reported), which controls for possible unobserved firm-specific effects.  
The variables that measure the equity issuance and acquisitions activity are 
contemporaneous because they proxy for the planned new equity issues and acquisitions. The 
reverse causality (from unification to new equity issues and acquisitions) is ruled out, because 
typically these decisions take time. It is not plausible to assume that the firm made a unification, 
observed a share price increase, and immediately (within a few months) decided to issue new 
equity and to make acquisitions. It is quite common that the decisions about new equity issue and 
unification are taken at the same annual (or extraordinary) meeting. The variables measuring firm 
size and growth opportunities are lagged one year in order to measure the situation before the 
unification. The variables that proxy for the private benefits of control are fixed; they measure the 
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We hypothesized that the need to raise new equity and make acquisitions of other 
companies increases the likelihood of unification. The results reported in Table V strongly 
confirm these predictions. Regression (1) shows that the probability of unification significantly 
increases in the years when firm plans to issue new equity. A planned new equity issue raises the 
probability of unification by 2.6% a year. Regression (2) reports that the size of new equity issue 
proceeds scaled by book value of equity significantly increases the likelihood of unification. A 
one standard deviation increase in EQUITY ISSUE PROCEEDS/ EQUITY raises the probability 
of unification by 0.7% a year. Regression (3) reports the results of the acquisitions effect. The 
data does not allow us to distinguish between the acquisitions with cash and stock. Higher 
acquisitions activity is expected to measure the fact that the firm may want to use stock in at least 
some of the acquisitions. A one standard deviation increase in ACQUISITIONS/ SIZE raises the 
likelihood of unification by 0.6% a year. In Regression (4) both, equity issues and acquisitions, 
effects are included in one model. The estimates remain highly significant.  
All the regressions in Table V show that SIZE, which controls for firm size, has a 
negative (but insignificant) effect on the probability of unification. Since smaller firms tend to be 
more likely takeover targets (e.g., Powell (1999)), this gives a weak evidence to the unification as 
a takeover defense story. INDUSTRY MTB which is a proxy for future growth opportunities has 
a positive relation with the probability of unification, as predicted. However, the growth 
opportunities are significant (at the 10% level) only if the firm is not planning to issue new equity 
in the nearest future. Regression (5) shows the results when an interaction term between EQUITY 
ISSUE DUMMY and INDUSTRY MTB is included. The positive and significant coefficient on 
INDUSTRY MTB means that among firms that do not plan to issue equity in the nearest future, 
the presence of growth opportunities raises the likelihood of unification. When firm plans to issue 
new equity and make acquisitions, INDUSTRY MTB has little additional explanatory power. 
All the proxies for the value of control and private benefits are significant and have the 
predicted signs. A higher difference between control rights and cash flow rights (CONTROL 
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MINUS ONWERSHIP) significantly reduces the likelihood of unification. A one standard 
deviation decrease in CONTROL MINUS OWNERSHIP increases the probability of unification 
by 0.8% a year. If the largest shareholder is a financial investor, the probability of unification 
increases by 2.3% a year. This result can mean that the financial investors have lower incentives 
for private benefit extraction. Alternatively, the financial investors are more concerned about the 
stock price of the companies they have invested in, as their performance is measured by the return 
on investment made. As predicted, the U.S. cross-listing is positively related to the likelihood of 
unification. If US CROSS-LISTING DUMMY changes from zero to one, the odds of unification 
increase by 2.6% a year. We do not differentiate between Level 1, 2, 3 and Rule 144A ADRs, but 
most of them are traded as Level 2 and Level 3 (capital raising issues that trade on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ). There are 19 cross-listed firms among the event group. All but 4 of them were cross-
listed before the unification, 2 tapped the US market in the same year as the unification took place 
(a couple of months after it), and 2 firms cross-listed in the US one and two years after the 
unification. Coding these 4 firms as not cross-listed slightly reduces the significance of this 
variable (to the 10% level).  
Several alternative specifications are tested (not reported). The separation between 
ownership and control can be alternatively measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the difference between the fraction of control and the fraction of ownership held by the 
largest shareholder is above the median separation in firms where control and ownership differ 
(CONTROL EXCEEDS OWNERSHIP, HIGH).
12 This variable has a significant negative effect 
(at the 5% level) on the likelihood of unification. If the controlling shareholder moves from high 
separation of ownership and control to low separation, the likelihood of unification raises by 
1.7% a year. If we include industry dummies instead of INDUSTRY MTB, the results on equity 
issues and acquisitions, as well as on private benefits proxies do not change. Firm MTB is not 
significant when INDUSTRY MTB is included. This means that the positive effect of firm’s 
MTB is driven by industry growth opportunities. Past SALES GROWTH and past CAPEX (as 
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proxies for growth opportunities) are not significant, suggesting that the event firms are 
associated with high expected growth rather than high current growth. Excluding financial 
industry (SIC 62-67) does not change the results. Excluding years of lower unification activity 
(1996 and 1997) does not change the results. The proxies for firm’s equity dependence as 
suggested by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), LEVERAGE, CASH FLOW/ ASSETS, CASH 
BALANCE/ ASSETS, CASH DIVIDENDS/ ASSETS, are not significant. These variables have 
only indirect effect on unification as they have some power in explaining the likelihood of new 
equity issues. A firm with higher leverage and lower cash resources is not more likely to unify 
unless it actually plans to issue new equity.  
One may argue that preferred stock (with preferential dividend) is introduced for different 
reasons than pure multiple voting stock (with equal dividend rights). All regressions were re-run 
separately for firms that have preferential dividend on low voting shares and for firms that do not 
have them. The main results remain unchanged suggesting that firms with preferred stock for the 
purposes of this study (as well as for many previous studies) bear similar characteristics to other 
dual-class firms.   
 
B. Alternative model specifications 
B.1. Unobserved firm effects 
The pooled probit ignores the possible effect of unobserved firm-specific factors which 
might be correlated with the explanatory variables. For example, majority owner’s family 
tradition to keep control might affect the resistance to issue new equity, the wish to keep higher 
separation between votes and equity, as well as the resistance to abandon dual-class shares. To 
control for these unobserved firm-specific effects, we also estimate fixed effects logit model (not 
reported). The advantage of this model is that it is possible to obtain a consistent estimator 
without any assumptions about how the unobserved firm effects are related to the explanatory 
variables. The disadvantage though is that we can only include the variables that vary over time at 
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least for some firms. All the signs on the main time-varying variables, EQUITY ISSUE 
DUMMY, EQUITY ISSUE PROCEEDS/ EQUITY, ACQUISITIONS/ SIZE, and INDUSTRY 
MTB, remain as predicted. The new equity issues lose significance (p-value is 0.2), acquisitions 
remain significant (at the 1% level), and industry growth opportunities are significant (at the 5% 
level), too.  
B.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
Table VI presents the results of a probit model on the probability to unify dual-class 
shares using average (cross-sectional) data on 493 firms. This model specification asks the 
question: What are the average characteristics of firms that unify their shares? In this model, the 
equity issue and acquisitions variables are averaged over all the sample years 1996-2002 to 
measure the average equity issuance and acquisitions activity in this period, while SIZE and 
INDUSTRY MTB are averaged over two years prior to the unification for event firms, and over 
1994-2001 for control firms. This way of averaging attempts to capture the situation in the dual-
class firms prior to a potential unification. The results are largely the same if the averaging for 
event firms is done over 1994 to one year prior to the unification. One variable is added if 
compared to the previous specifications, namely a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
there has been at least one new equity issue in period 1996-2002. The average of EQUITY ISSUE 
(ADJUSTED) DUMMY is used instead of simple EQUITY ISSUE DUMMY to avoid 
overstating equity issuance activity if the firm does not report the proceeds from new equity 
issues in years when there have been no issues.   
The results in Table VI largely confirm my previous findings. If a firm has made a 
seasoned equity offering at least once during 1996-2002, the probability of unification in this 
period increases by 15%. A one standard deviation increase in EQUITY ISSUE PROCEEDS/ 
EQUITY (AVERAGE) raises the likelihood of unification by 3%, and a one standard deviation 
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increase in ACQUITIONS/ SIZE (AVERAGE) by 4%. INDUSTRY MTB is highly significant, 
too (at the 1% level), a one standard deviation increase in this variable raises the likelihood of 
unification by 8%. Separation between ownership and control remains negative and highly 
significant. The effect of financial investor and U.S. cross-listing is positive but less significant. 
The results suggest that the firms that unified their shares in 1996-2002 were on average more 
active in issuing new equity and had substantially higher growth opportunities than other dual-
class firms.  
 
B.3. Continuous endogenous explanatory variables test 
A source of concern both in cross-sectional model and panel data is that the equity issue 
and acquisitions variables are endogenous. It is difficult to find a good instrument for these 
variables to carry out the instrumental variables models or a bivariate probit. As a robustness, I 
perform a test of endogeneity using  continuous endogenous explanatory variables method 
(described in Wooldridge (2002)) treating EQUITY ISSUE DUMMY (AVERAGE) as an 
endogenous variable (not reported). I use LEVERAGE (AVERAGE) as an instrument for equity 
issues. Leverage is clearly correlated with new equity issues. High leverage is one of the reasons 
why companies need to approach equity markets, and there is no evidence why it should be 
directly correlated with the unification decision. However, we can only rely on the results of this 
test if we believe that the average leverage is exogenous (one can argue that it is hard to change 
leverage quickly and dramatically). If one disagrees with this assumption, the following test does 
not make sense. So, for those who believe… In the first step, average EQUITY ISSUE DUMMY 
is regressed on INDUSTRY MTB, LEVERAGE, SIZE, and country dummies. I ndeed, 
LEVERAGE has a significant positive impact on the new equity issues, and so does INDUSTRY 
MTB. In the second step, probit regression is estimated including the residuals from the first-step 
regression. The t-statistic on the residuals is a direct test of the null hypothesis of endogeneity of 
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equity issues variable. The  t-statistic is 0.68 (not significant). The average EQUITY ISSUE 
DUMMY remains significant.  
B.4.  Matching sample 
One way to deal with the problem of endogeneity of equity issues and acquisitions 
variables is to construct a matching sample of firms, where the matching is based on the most 
likely suspects for endogeneity. I match firms on size, industry and market-to-book, and check 
whether there is still substantial difference in new equity issues and acquisitions (and other 
variables) between the event group and the control group.  
The combination of Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) matching 
algorithms is used to find the closest match for each event firm. The firms are matched on 
industry, size (log of sales), and MTB ratios. All 493 main sample dual-class firms are divided 
into 108 groups: 12 industries
13 times 3 size categories times 3 MTB categories. MTB data at the 
end of the year preceding the unification is missing for 7 event firms, which are therefore 
excluded. The closest match for 101 event firm is found based on firm characteristics at the end 
of the year preceding the unification. 
Panel A of Table VII reports the comparison of means of different variables in the two 
matched groups three, two, and one year prior to the unification. The table reports the t-Statistic 
of testing the equality of means. The results are largely the same if we use the z-Statistic testing 
the equality of distributions between the event firms and control firms using the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that the 
value of control (private benefits) is lower in firms that decide to unify the shares. In particular, 
CONTROL MINUS OWNERSHIP and CONTROL EXCEEDS OWNERSHIP, HIGH is 
significantly lower (at the 1% level) in the event firms than in the control firms. There are more 
firms with preferential dividends on low voting shares among event firms. Removing the 
preferential dividend makes the unification more attractive for the controlling shareholders (and 
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other high voting shareholders). VOTING PREMIUM three, two, and one year prior to the 
unification is significantly lower in the event companies but this is purely the effect of 
preferential dividends. Zingales (1995) and Nenova (2003) have shown that dividend preference 
for low voting shares reduces the voting premium. In firms with equal dividend rights to high and 
low voting shares, there is no significant difference in voting premium.  
The comparison between the matching sample strongly corroborates the finding that the 
firms that issue new equity and make acquisitions are the ones that are more likely to unify their 
shares (see Panel B of Table VII). The difference between the equity issue and acquisitions 
variables in year zero (the unification year) is statistically significant. Thirty six percent of event 
firms issued equity compared to only 19% of the matched control firms, and average 
ACQUISITIONS/ SIZE was 0.23 in the event firms compared to 0.11 in the matched control 
firms.  
The results show that the INDUSTRY ADJUSTED MTB prior to the unification is 
consistently higher in the event firms, but the difference is not significant. The event firms appear 
to pay lower cash dividends prior to the unification. Also cash flow is lower and the leverage 
higher (not significant). One of the explanations for this pattern is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
equity dependence story, namely that the cash constraints raise the need for new equity capital 
and hence the likelihood of unification. Keeping growth opportunities constant, the event firms 
are the ones that are more dependent on equity capital.  
 
C. Evidence from takeovers of dual-class firms  
To address the hypothesis that the unification can be a method to defend a takeover, I 
explore the characteristics of dual-class firms that were taken over during the period 1996-2002. 
Panel B of Table III shows that 63 of firms that had dual-class shares at the end of 1995 were 
taken over or merged. About half of them were taken over by (or merged with) single-class 
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companies, and the other half by dual-class companies. As we argued before, acquiring control in 
a dual-class company is cheaper than in a single-class company because the raider can buy high 
voting shares. Moreover, there can be a hostile takeover if the high voting shares are not closely 
held by the controlling shareholder.  
Forty percent of all the dual-class takeovers happened in Sweden. For this and for data 
availability reasons I look deeper into these 25 companies. I find that 62% of all the companies 
that were taken over had “widely held” dual-class shares, i.e. the high voting shares (A shares) 
were distributed among many shareholders. Among the seven firms that unified their shares in 
Sweden, all but one firm had widely held high voting shares, suggesting that these firms were 
potential takeover targets. Among the firms that stayed dual-class throughout the sample period 
(in Sweden) less than half (49%) of them had widely held high voting shares. Combined with the 
fact that all but one of the unification firms had a financial investor as the largest shareholder (a 
proxy for low private benefits of control), this evidence suggests that firms can choose to unify 




Using different model specifications, the results strongly confirm the hypotheses that the 
firms that are dependent on new equity capital, make more acquisitions of other companies, and 
have a controlling shareholder with lower private benefits of control are more likely to unify their 
shares. Evidence from Sweden suggests that the unification can be done to prevent a takeover, i.e. 
to make the control rights more expensive.  
 
V. Ex-post consequences of unification 
In this section two methods are used to estimate the possible consequences of the 
unification. The change in ownership after the unification is also discussed here. 
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A. Main model 
The consequences of unification are estimated using fixed-effects regressions in which 
the effect of unification is captured by dummy variables for the year of the unification and the 
three subsequent years (see Section II.B.). The different variables can be affected not only by the 
unification decision but by some fundamental changes in the firm. To control for these 
fundamental effects, we include the most applicable control variables. The estimates of other 
variables (not reported) are discussed where appropriate.  
Table VIII presents the results. The INDUSTRY ADJUSTED MTB increases 
significantly in the year of the unification and the two consecutive years. The joint test shows that 
the sum of the coefficients for the two years after the unification is significantly positive (at the 
1% level). The result remains significant when we control for lagged sales growth and return on 
equity. The result holds also when we include only firms that issued equity in the same year as the 
unification. This finding provides evidence that firms actually reach their goal of increasing the 
share value by switching to one share-one vote.  
LEVERAGE decreases significantly in the first and second year after the unification. 
CAPEX increases in all years following the unification, but the effect is not significant. SALES 
GROWTH increases significantly following the unification. The joint test shows that the sum of 
coefficients for the two and three years after the unification is significantly positive (at the 5% 
level). The effect on operating performance is mixed; there is no change in ROA, while ROE 
slightly decreases (not significant). CASH FLOW/ ASSETS, CASH BALANCE/ ASSETS, and 
CASH DIVIDENDS/ ASSETS all increase after the unification, but the result is slightly 
significant only for cash dividends. 
EQUITY ISSUE PROCEEDS/ EQUITY and ACQUISITIONS/ SIZE remain positive in 
the year of the unification. The equity issues decrease in the year following the unification (not 
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significant). The result suggests that if a firm has decided to issue new equity, the equity issue is 
timed together with the unification to mask the negative signal of a SEO. Previous research has 
shown that the SEOs are followed by lower market valuations (Loughran and Ritter (1995) and 
Levis (1995)) and performance (Loughran and Ritter (1997)). The unification, in turn, creates a 
positive publicity of improving corporate governance. In firms that issued equity in the 
unification year, INDUSTRY ADJUSTED MTB increases following the unification, suggesting 
that the positive signal of the unification is stronger than the negative signal of a SEO. 
B. Robustness check: matching sample 
Following the matching on industry, size, and MTB introduced in Section IV.B., we 
compare the financial ratios in the event group and the matched control group one to three years 
after the unification. The results are presented in Panel B of Table VII.  
The comparison of means between the event firms and the matched control firms 
corroborates the result of increased market valuation after the unification. INDUSTRY 
ADJUSTED MTB in the event firms is higher in all three years after the unification. The 
difference is the highest in the year following the unification. Interestingly, the sign of the 
variable changes: average INDUSTRY ADJUSTED MTB becomes positive for the event firms in 
the first and second year after the unification, while it remains negative for the control firms. The 
result confirms that the firms succeed to increase the market value by unifying their shares.  
Operating performance (ROA and ROE) in the years following the unification tends to be 
lower in the event group, but the result is not significant. The results on CAPEX and SALES 
GROWTH are mixed and not significant. Interestingly, once we keep growth opportunities fixed, 
the firms that unified their shares are not growing faster and investing more than similar firms 
that have kept the dual-class share structure. LEVERAGE is lower in the event group following 
the unification. We may observe that the difference arises because of increased leverage in the 
control group and slightly decreased leverage in the event group. Given the fact that the control 
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firms are the closest matches by growth opportunities, it can be interpreted that the event firms 
have chosen to finance the growth with equity, while the control firms with debt.  
C. Ownership changes 
Table IX summarizes the changes in ownership structure after the unification in 71 event 
firm (where the data were available). This summary attempts to shed some light on the hypothesis 
that the unification is more likely if the controlling shareholder is planning to sell his stake, i.e., is 
eager to increase the security benefits.  
Panel A of Table IX shows that the controlling shareholder (before the unification) does 
not have a block of shares (10% of total stock) after the unification in 28% of cases (20 out of 71 
firm). It is a weak support to the hypothesis that the controlling shareholder’s willingness to sell 
out may be one of the reasons for unification. However, in most of the cases (66%), the 
controlling shareholder keeps some control by holding at least 10% of total stock. Therefore, it is 
hard to argue that the controlling shareholder’s willingness to sell his stake is one of the main 
drivers for the unification.  
In Panel B of Table IX, we observe that on average the controlling shareholder’s voting 
power decreases from 39% to 23%, while the equity stake stays virtually the same. The decrease 
in voting power is mainly the consequence of the unification (the alignment of control and 
ownership stakes) rather than from selling the shares.  
 
D. Summary 
A firm that unifies its dual-class shares experiences increased market value and sales 
growth after the unification if compared to the firm itself before the unification. Comparing firms 
with similar growth opportunities, firms that unify the shares experience higher market values and 
lower leverage, but no difference in sales growth if compared to other dual-class firms. This 
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result suggests that dual-class share structure per se does not preclude firms from growth unless 
they depend on equity capital. The hypothesis that the controlling shareholder sells his shares 
after the unification is not confirmed in my data.    
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the unification of dual -class shares is carried out with an aim to 
increase the firm’s market value and reduce the cost of new equity financing. The data shows that 
firms that unify their dual-class shares are more active in issuing new equities, make more 
acquisitions, and have higher industry growth opportunities – the firm characteristics that are 
associated with substantial gains from higher firm value. The results hold after including various 
controls and are robust to different methodologies. Further, the ex-post analysis of the unification 
shows that the firms reach their goal. The average market-to-book ratios that are constantly lower 
in dual-class firms jump to the average level of single-class firms in the same industry right after 
the unification.  
An important precondition for the unification to happen is the approval by the controlling 
shareholder(s). I find that higher value of control rights significantly reduces the probability of 
unification. In particular, the firms that unified their shares have lower separation between voting 
rights and cash flow rights, higher presence of financial investors, and higher frequency of cross-
listing in the U.S. This evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that the unification is a way 
to prevent a takeover by a raider with high private benefits.  
This paper supports the view that the dual -class shares are temporary structures kept until 
the point when the firm needs new equity capital for further expansion and growth (Amoako-Adu 
and Smith (2001)). For some firms it may take few years, for others it may never happen. By 
comparing dual-class firms with ex-ante similar growth opportunities, the results show that there 
is no difference in ex-post sales growth and capital expenditure between the firms that u nified 
shares and those that stayed dual-class. There is a difference, however, in how the two groups 
36
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 465
March 2005 
finance growth. The ones that unify are more equity capital dependent, and find it optimal to 
boost the share value. The ones that stay dual-class, finance growth with retained earnings or 
debt, and may not be concerned that the share price is lower than that of single-class firms in the 
industry. In sum, the paper suggests that all dual-class firms should not be forced by law to switch 
to one share-one vote. The firms that need to approach equity markets for capital will sooner or 
later be forced by the market to unify their shares.  
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Regulatory and other issues related to dual-class 
shares 
Denmark  High voting shares have 
10 times the voting 
rights of low voting 
shares. 
Abandoning 
multiple voting right 
shares. 
One of the recommendations by the Nørby 
Committee’s (which was set up in March 2001) 
report on Corporate Governance in Denmark is: “It is 
recommended that there is proportionality between 
capital investments and voting rights and that the 
board refrains from countering takeover bids on its 
own”. The Copenhagen Stock Exchange has 
recommended the listed companies to relate to the 
Nørby Committee’s recommendations for good 
corporate governance in their annual reports and 
accounts. 
Finland  High voting shares have 
10-20 times the voting 
rights of low voting 
shares. 
Abandoning 
multiple voting right 
shares. 
The change in the Companies Act (in effect from 1 
September 1997) stipulates that a 2/3 majority is 
required in every share class for certain important 
corporate decisions to be made. This change 
effectively increased the capital needed to secure 
control.  
Germany  Ordinary shares have 
one vote. Preference 
shares are nonvoting. 
Maximum allowable 
non-voting preference 
share capital is one half. 
Law prescribes a priority 






Stock market index compilers have been urging 
companies to standardize shares through abolishing 
preference shares in order to make indices more 
transparent and accurate. Following the re-
evaluation of the Dax and M-Dax indices on June, 
2002, only one type of share is permitted for 
inclusion in the index (i.e., either ordinary or 
preference share of the company). Preference 
shares are not allowed to be listed on Neuer Markt 
(established in 1997). 
Italy  Ordinary shares have 
one vote. Savings 
shares are nonvoting. 
Non voting (and limited 
voting) capital may not 
exceed 50% of stock 
capital. Nonvoting 
shares (savings shares) 
are entitled to a 
minimum dividend equal 
to 5% of the par value. 
Abandoning (non-
voting right) 
savings shares and 
limited voting right 
shares. 
In 1998, legal protection for investors was improved 
with the so called Draghi’s law. If evaluated in terms 
of the index of shareholder protection developed by 
La Porta et al. (1998), the impact of this law was an 
improvement in shareholder protection from 1 to 5. 
The threshold to call a shareholder meeting was 
reduced to 10%. The loopholes in the takeover law 
were corrected. Minority shareholders were given 
more rights to voice their opinions. See Aganin and 
Volpin (2003). Only ordinary shares are allowed to 
be listed on Nuovo Mercato (established in 1999). 
Norway  A shares have one vote. 
B shares are nonvoting. 
Special government 




multiple voting right 
shares. 
Eierforum is an informal group that represents the 
largest institutional investors in Norway. The group 
has produced guidelines for good shareholder 
accountability, which suggest that “The board should 
positively encourage all activities which strengthen 
liquidity in the company's shares, and should ensure 
that such activities are based on the principle of one 
share-one vote.” 
Sweden  High voting shares have 
10 times the voting 
rights of low voting 
shares. 
Abandoning 
multiple voting right 
shares. 
There have been proposals since long to change the 
law that allows the differentiation between voting 
power of A and B shares. Since 1997, shares can 
be issued only at a maximum ratio of 1:10 votes 
(previously, up to 1:1000 was allowed).  
Switzerland  Each share has one 
vote, but different 
classes are allowed to 
have different nominal 
value, i.e., in principle, 







The current trend toward converting bearer shares 
into registered shares has mainly two sources: an 
increasing awareness of the importance of investor 
relations and technological developments enabling 
companies to handle extensive shareholder 
registers in electronic form. 
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Variable  Description 
Main sample:   Firms that a) are included in Moody’s/ Mergent International Companies Manuals 1996-
2002, b) are not commercial banks or credit institutions (two-digit SIC code 60 and 61), 
c) had a dual-class share structure at the end of 1995, d) at least one share class was 
listed at the end of 1995, e) are still listed on the stock exchange at the end of 2002, 
and… 
Event group  … f) have only one share class at the end of 2002 (i.e., that unified share classes in the 
period 1996-2002).  
Control group  … f) still have dual-class share structure at the end of 2002. 
Unification year  The year when firm’s shareholders approved the switch from dual-class to single-class 
shares. 
Annual data:  Annual data for 1994-2002 is collected. All variables (unless specified otherwise) are 
Winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile. Source: Worldscope (unless specified 
otherwise). 
Industry MTB  Average market-to-book ratio of single-class firms in the respective industry. Industry is 
classified by the SIC two-digit code. All market-to-book ratios are Winsorized at the 1
st 
and 99
th percentile prior to taking industry averages. The pool of all single share class 
firms in the sample countries is taken from Worldscope August-2003 disk. 
MTB  Firm’s market value of equity over book value of equity. 
Industry adjusted MTB  MTB minus Industry MTB. 
Size  Natural logarithm of firm’s sales. 
ROA  Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) over total assets. 
ROE  Net income over book value of shareholder’s equity. 
Leverage  Total debt over total capital (debt plus shareholder’s equity). 
CAPEX  Capital expenditures over one-year lagged net property, plant and equipment. 
Cash flow/ Assets  Operating cash flow over one-year lagged total assets. 
Cash balance/ Assets  Cash and cash equivalents (in the balance sheet) over total assets. 
Cash dividends/ Assets  Total cash dividends distributed to shareholders over one-year lagged total assets. 
Sales growth  The annual rate of growth of sales. 
Voting premium  Price of high voting share minus Price of low voting share divided by Price of low voting 
share. The annual voting premium is obtained by averaging monthly voting premiums. 
Source: Datastream. 
Voting premium (no pref. dividend)  Voting premium conditional on equal dividend rights to high and low voting shares. 
Equity issue dummy  Equals one if the company issued new equity in that year; and zero if net equity issue 
proceeds are zero. (When net equity issue proceeds are not reported in the cash flow 
statement, the dummy variable is coded as missing.)  
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy  Equals one if the company issued new equity in that year; and zero otherwise. (When 
net equity issue proceeds are not reported in the cash flow statement, the dummy 
variable is coded as zero.) 
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  Net equity issue proceeds (from the cash flow statement) over shareholder’s equity at 
the end of previous year.  
Acquisitions/ Size  Number of new firms acquired in a given year over firm size (log of sales). Repeated 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
Fixed data:   
US cross-listing dummy  Equals one if company’s shares (at least one class) is cross-listed in the US at the end 
of 1995 through an ADR (American Depository Receipt) program (not differentiating 
between various types of listing). Sources: Datastream, Moody’s/ Mergent Manuals. 
Both shares listed dummy  Equals one if all shares with different voting rights are listed on the stock exchange; and 
zero otherwise. Sources: Datastream, Moody’s/ Mergent Manuals. 
Dividend dummy  Equals one if low voting shares received higher dividend than high voting shares in at 
least one year during 1990 and 2001. Equals one half if low voting shares have a 
minimum dividend requirement set in the bylaws, but in practice both shares have 
received the same dividend since 1990 (e.g., because the dividend was above the 
minimum required). Equals zero if both shares have equal dividend rights. Sources: 
Moody’s/ Mergent Manuals, Datastream, annual reports, Lexis-Nexis. 
Ownership data:  For control group, the ownership data come from Faccio and Lang (2002), from the 
annual reports and Worldscope (for Denmark, which is not covered in Faccio and Lang). 
Faccio and Lang data is from 1996 for Germany, Italy, and Switzerland; from 1998 - for 
Sweden and Norway; and from 1999 - for Finland. For event group, the ownership data 
come from the annual reports one year prior to the unification, Worldscope, or Lexis-
Nexis. The ownership data after the unification for event firms come from the annual 
reports and Lexis-Nexis. 
Control  Fraction of the firm’s voting rights owned by the largest shareholder (ranked by votes). 
Ownership  Fraction of the firm’s capital (cash flow) rights owned by the largest shareholder (ranked 
by votes). 
Control minus Ownership  The difference between control rights and cash flow rights.  
Control exceeds Ownership, high  Equals one if control rights (Control) are higher than cash flow rights (Ownership), and if 
this separation is higher than the median separation in corporations where control and 
ownership differ, and zero otherwise. 
Family owner dummy  Equals one if the largest shareholder (ranked by votes) is a family (a private person or 
individuals with the same surname or a family trust); and zero otherwise. 
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Table I 












- … enhance the liquidity of shares (ABB). 
- … resolve the problem concerning the liquidity of the shares (Amer Group). 
- … the amalgamation of shares has increased the level of trading in the company’s shares (Rieber 
& Son).  
- … improve demand in international capital markets. …we expect increased share liquidity 
(Sudzucker).  
- … will further increase the liquidity of Company’s shares (MLP). 
- … improve liquidity (HERLITZ). 









- … positive impact on shareholder value… the share value is expected to increase (HERLITZ).  
- … the company will raise its capital over the next three years. “… we would prefer our share 
price to look better” [this was said 3 month before the unification] (FAG). 
- … improved market capitalization (Recordati). 
- … placement of Company’s shares [right after the unification] was considered to be a success 
given the recent weakness of international markets and considering that during May some 70 initial 











- …make it easier for outside investors to invest in the company. …a strong European investor 
would strengthen the company’s position (DSV). 
- …attract a wider spread of domestic and foreign shareholders (PUMA).  
- … will satisfy Italian and foreign institutional investors (COFIDE).  
- … increase interest in Company’s shares in the US (Amer Group). 
- … making shares more attractive particularly to institutional investors (MLP). 
- … the group will boost the interest of foreign investors in Company’s shares to internationalize 














- …making the stock more attractive to international investors. Yet, while SAP's three founders, 
including the co- chief executive and supervisory board chairman, dilute their voting rights, 
effective control stays in their hands. (SAP). 
- In international capital markets one share-one vote system dominates. The non-voting preference 
shares are widely unknown abroad, and are loosing importance also in Germany (Sudzucker).  
- The stock market – particularly, the foreign investors – do not understand this division of shares, 
and better buy clear and simple value. It is “downright grotesque” that Herlitz remains in this “Not 
Luxus” category with two share classes, while renowned companies (Fielmann, Metro, and 
Lufthansa) are abandoning preference shares. When one reads the stock quotes in the newspaper, 










- It is very difficult to pay for a US acquisition with shares if your management owns a majority of 
the voting rights. (Merrill Lynch analyst) 
- …could increase its leeway to pay for acquisitions with shares (SAP). 
- … this will allow to handle acquisitions and strategic alliances by using shares in addition to debt 
financing (ABB). 
- German capital market law restricts preference shares that can be issued in proportion to ordinary 









- …establishing basis for new, profitable growth (KVAERNER). 
- … will have increased freedom in procuring additional capital. Company is currently in a 
dynamic emergence phase (ASCOM). 
- … CEO expects the dynamic growth of the Company (Disetronic Holding). 
- … create good basis for the future international growth of the Company (MLP). 






- … enhance financial flexibility (ABB).  
- … to be able to act flexibly (ASCOM). 
- … augment considerably Company’s financial flexibility (Olivetti).  
DEFEND TAKE-
OVER 
(33)  - … the move has been seen as a tactical maneuver meant to defend the Company against foreign 
attempts to take over. With the power shares gone, a 10 per cent vote in Nokia would now cost 
SEK 73bn (NOKIA).  
Sources: Lexis-Nexis, company home-pages. 
45
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 465
March 2005 
Table II 
Dual-class firms in percent of total listed firms and domestic newly listed companies 
Panel A shows the number of total firms (excluding banks and credit institutions, SIC2 60 and 61) and firms with dual-
class shares available in Moody’s/ Mergent International Companies 1996 (for end of 1995 data) and 2002 (for end of 
2001 data) Manuals. Panel B shows the fraction of dual-class firms as percent of all domestic newly listed companies in 
each year from 1996 to 2002. The number of new dual-class listings is given in parentheses. The data for all countries 
but Germany come from the stock exchange web-sites and Datastream. The data for Germany was kindly provided by 
Olaf Ehrhardt. 
 
Panel A: Fraction of dual-class firms in total listed firms, 1995 vs. 2001 


















Denmark  124  74  59.7%  123  45  36.6%  -39% 
Finland  66  30  45.5%  92  22  23.9%  -47% 
Germany  345  84  24.3%  740  85  11.5%  -53% 
Italy  156  64  41.0%  81  28  34.6%  -16% 
Norway  71  17  23.9%  121  9  7.4%  -69% 
Sweden  142  87  61.3%  203  94  46.3%  -24% 
Switzerland  197  92  46.7%  235  62  26.4%  -44% 
Total  1101  452  41.1%  1595  345  21.6%  -47% 
 
Panel B: Fraction (number) of dual-class firms in domestic newly listed companies, 1996-2002  
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Denmark  33% (2)  20% (1)  23% (3)  17% (1)  14% (1)  0% (0)  0% (0) 
Finland  0% (0)  33% (4)  25% (3)  11% (3)  0% (0)  11% (1)  0% (0) 
Germany  5% (1)  6% (2)  0% (0)  1% (1)  0% (0)  0% (0)  0% (0) 
Italy  0% (0)  15% (2)  5% (1)  6% (2)  0% (0)  0% (0)  0% (0) 
Norway  10% (2)  4% (2)  4% (1)  0% (0)  0% (0)  8% (1)  0% (0) 
Sweden  59% (10)  42% (21)  50% (16)  45% (21)  28% (16)  32% (6)  29% (2) 
Switzerland  50% (3)  8% (1)  0% (0)  0% (0)  0% (0)  0% (0)  0% (0) 
Average  22% (18)  18% (33)  15% (24)  11% (28)  6% (17)  7% (8)  4% (2) 
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Panel A describes the procedure of constructing the main sample of 493 companies used in this paper. In Panel B, 
sample construction is subdivided by country. Panel C shows the distribution of number of companies that switched from 
dual-class to single-class shares in the period from 1996 to 2002, by years and countries. Panel D shows the sample of 
firms subdivided by twelve industry groups. 
Panel A: Sample construction 
601  100%  Dual class firms (excluding banks and credit institutions, SIC2 60 and 61) available in Moody's/ 
Mergent manuals (1996-2002) which were listed on the stock exchange at the end of 1995. 
- 63  10%  Merged or taken over during 1996-2002. 
- 22  4%  Delisted by stock exchange order or voluntarily (because of too little free float) during 1996-2002. 
- 7  1%  Delisted, not clear why. 
- 8  1%  Not traceable. 
- 8  1%  Data not available in Worldscope. 
493  82%  Main sample. The firms that were still listed on the stock exchange at the end of 2002. 
out of which:   
108  18%  Firms that unified their shares in 1996-2002 (event group). 
385  64%  Firms that stayed dual-class throughout 1996-2002 (control group). 
Panel B: Sample construction by country 
  Event  Control  Merged or T/O  Delisted  Other  Total 
Denmark  10  55  14  6  3  88 
Finland  6  30  4  1  1  42 
Germany  41  88  9  2  1  141 
Italy  12  45  3  8  1  69 
Norway  6  9  2  3  -  20 
Sweden  7  99  25  3  2  136 
Switzerland  26  59  6  6  8  105 
Total  108  385  63  29  16  601 
Panel C: Unifications by country and year 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
Denmark  -  1  1  1  1  2  4  10 
Finland  -  1  1  3  -  1  -  6 
Germany  6  1  7  7  9  8  3  41 
Italy  -  1  1  2  3  2  3  12 
Norway  -  -  -  1  1  4  -  6 
Sweden  -  -  1  -  3  2  1  7 
Switzerland  2  3  6  3  6  4  2  26 
Total  8  7  17  17  23  23  13  108 
Panel D: Main sample by industry 
Industry  Firms (main sample)  Number of unifications  Unifications (in %) 
Basic industry  4  0  0.0% 
Capital goods  84  15  17.9% 
Construction  52  9  17.3% 
Consumer durables  29  9  31.0% 
Financial/ real estate  36  4  11.1% 
Food and tobacco  74  21  28.4% 
Leisure  28  8  28.6% 
Petroleum  21  6  28.6% 
Services  38  6  15.8% 
Textiles and trade  41  11  26.8% 
Transportation  22  3  13.6% 
Utilities  64  16  25.0% 
Total  493  108  21.9% 
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In Panel A, the summary statistics refer to the firm-years of the whole sample of 493 companies, in Panel B – to the firm-
years of companies that unified their shares in 1996-2002, and in Panel C – to the firm-years of companies that stayed 
dual-class throughout 1996-2002. T-Statistics and (two-sided) significance levels of testing the equality of means between 
the event group and the control group are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. Appendix B provides definitions for the variables. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs.  t-statistic  Sig. 
Panel A: The Whole Sample 
Industry MTB  2.93  2.80  1.33  0.74  13.86  3438     
MTB  2.43  1.53  2.91  0.27  28.26  3020     
Industry adjusted MTB  -0.57  -0.98  2.76  -12.49  25.10  3007     
Size  5.50  5.54  0.95  0.48  7.96  3145     
ROA  0.05  0.05  0.10  -0.61  0.50  3070     
ROE  0.09  0.10  0.28  -1.93  1.87  3039     
Leverage  0.25  0.24  0.18  0.00  0.82  3146     
CAPEX  0.33  0.19  0.54  0.00  4.39  2964     
Cash flow/ Assets  0.07  0.07  0.09  -0.59  0.39  2686     
Cash balance/ Assets  0.12  0.08  0.13  0.00  0.84  3149     
Cash dividends/ Assets  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.20  3078     
Sales growth  0.10  0.06  0.28  -0.50  1.32  3065     
Voting premium  0.16  0.05  0.33  -0.88  1.60  1186     
Equity issue dummy  0.23  0.00  0.42  0.00  1.00  2554     
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy  0.17  0.00  0.37  0.00  1.00  3451     
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  0.06  0.00  0.25  0.00  1.84  2535     
Acquisitions/ Size  0.11  0.00  0.21  0.00  1.10  3145     
US cross-listing dummy  0.11  0.00  0.31  0.00  1.00  493     
Both shares listed dummy  0.60  1.00  0.49  0.00  1.00  467     
Dividend dummy  0.42  0.00  0.48  0.00  1.00  354     
Control  0.45  0.44  0.24  0.00  1.00  399     
Ownership  0.29  0.25  0.22  0.00  1.00  385     
Control minus Ownership  0.15  0.12  0.14  -0.40  0.67  384     
Control exceeds Ownership, high  0.43  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  384     
Family owner dummy  0.44  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  400     
Financial investor dummy  0.11  0.00  0.31  0.00  1.00  400     
Panel B: Event group 
Industry MTB  3.03  2.83  1.35  0.74  9.76  744  2.400  ** 
MTB  2.97  1.87  3.43  0.33  28.26  680  5.524  *** 
Industry adjusted MTB  -0.25  -0.82  2.99  -8.31  23.82  668  3.408  *** 
Size  5.63  5.70  0.92  2.29  7.50  700  3.899  *** 
ROA  0.05  0.05  0.10  -0.61  0.50  688  1.159   
ROE  0.09  0.12  0.33  -1.93  1.87  680  0.403   
Leverage  0.25  0.24  0.18  0.00  0.82  701  0.107   
CAPEX  0.34  0.20  0.54  0.00  4.39  668  0.567   
Cash flow/ Assets  0.07  0.07  0.09  -0.38  0.39  615  1.669  * 
Cash balance/ Assets  0.13  0.08  0.13  0.00  0.84  701  0.208   
Cash dividends/ Assets  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.17  685  0.402   
Sales growth  0.12  0.07  0.30  -0.50  1.32  687  1.321   
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Table IV (Continued) 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs.  t-statistic  Sig. 
Panel B: Event group 
Voting premium  0.14  0.07  0.29  -0.63  1.49  207  -0.821   
Equity issue dummy  0.29  0.00  0.45  0.00  1.00  593  4.447  *** 
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy  0.23  0.00  0.42  0.00  1.00  756  5.214  *** 
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  0.10  0.00  0.33  0.00  1.84  588  3.986  *** 
Acquisitions/ Size  0.14  0.00  0.24  0.00  1.10  700  4.181  *** 
US cross-listing dummy  0.18  0.00  0.38  0.00  1.00  108  2.712  *** 
Both shares listed dummy  0.65  1.00  0.48  0.00  1.00  106  1.227   
Dividend dummy  0.52  0.50  0.47  0.00  1.00  94  2.334  ** 
Control  0.40  0.36  0.23  0.06  0.99  97  -2.217  ** 
Ownership  0.26  0.22  0.19  0.00  0.93  83  -1.526   
Control minus Ownership  0.12  0.09  0.12  0.00  0.48  82  -2.363  ** 
Control exceeds Ownership, high  0.29  0.00  0.46  0.00  1.00  82  -2.848  *** 
Family owner dummy  0.39  0.00  0.49  0.00  1.00  98  -1.255   
Financial investor dummy  0.19  0.00  0.40  0.00  1.00  98  3.341  *** 
Panel C: Control group 
Industry MTB  2.90  2.79  1.33  0.75  13.86  2694     
MTB  2.27  1.44  2.73  0.27  28.26  2340     
Industry adjusted MTB  -0.67  -1.04  2.69  -12.49  25.10  2339     
Size  5.47  5.49  0.96  0.48  7.96  2445     
ROA  0.05  0.05  0.10  -0.61  0.50  2382     
ROE  0.09  0.10  0.27  -1.93  1.87  2359     
Leverage  0.25  0.24  0.18  0.00  0.82  2445     
CAPEX  0.33  0.19  0.54  0.00  4.39  2296     
Cash flow/ Assets  0.06  0.07  0.09  -0.59  0.39  2071     
Cash balance/ Assets  0.12  0.08  0.13  0.00  0.84  2448     
Cash dividends/ Assets  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.20  2393     
Sales growth  0.10  0.06  0.27  -0.50  1.32  2378     
Voting premium  0.16  0.04  0.34  -0.88  1.60  979     
Equity issue dummy  0.20  0.00  0.40  0.00  1.00  1961     
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy  0.15  0.00  0.36  0.00  1.00  2695     
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  0.05  0.00  0.22  0.00  1.84  1947     
Acquisitions/ Size  0.10  0.00  0.20  0.00  1.10  2445     
US cross-listing dummy  0.09  0.00  0.28  0.00  1.00  385     
Both shares listed dummy  0.58  1.00  0.49  0.00  1.00  361     
Dividend dummy  0.38  0.00  0.48  0.00  1.00  260     
Control  0.46  0.48  0.24  0.00  1.00  302     
Ownership  0.30  0.26  0.23  0.00  1.00  302     
Control minus Ownership  0.16  0.15  0.14  -0.40  0.67  302     
Control exceeds Ownership, high  0.47  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  302     
Family owner dummy  0.46  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  302     
Financial investor dummy  0.08  0.00  0.27  0.00  1.00  302     
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Table V 
Ex-ante determinants of the unification (pooled probit) 
The effect of the variables listed on the probability to unify dual-class shares is estimated by a pooled probit model:  
Prob(Unifyit=1) = F(X ita),  
where Unifyit is a variable that equals 1 if company i switched to a single-class share system in year t and 0 if it remained 
dual-class in this year (a firm is dropped from the sample after it unifies the shares), F(.) is the cumulative distribution 
function of a standard normal variable, a is a vector of coefficients, and Xit is a vector of explanatory variables (listed in 
the first column) observed for firm i in year t. The estimation method is maximum likelihood. EQUITY ISSUE DUMMY, 
EQUITY ISSUE PROCEEDS/ EQUITY, and ACQUISITIONS/ SIZE are contemporaneous. SIZE and INDUSTRY MTB 
are lagged one year. CONTROL MINUS OWNERSHIP, FINANCIAL INVESTOR DUMMY and US CROSS-LISTING 
DUMMY are fixed over years (ownership data for the control firms is from 1996-1999, and for the event firms one or few 
years before the unification). Detailed definitions for the variables are provided in Appendix B. The regressions also 
include a constant term, year dummies, and country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level: independence of errors between clusters (firms) is assumed, but 
the independence assumption is relaxed for within-cluster (firm) errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Equity issue dummy  0.387***      0.380***  0.674** 
  (0.134)      (0.134)  (0.314) 
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity    0.479***       
    (0.185)       
Acquisitions/ Size      0.544**  0.495**   
      (0.234)  (0.252)   
Equity issue dummy * Industry MTB          -0.087 
          (0.083) 
Size  -0.094  -0.061  -0.053  -0.135*  -0.097 
  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.077) 
Industry MTB  0.073  0.066  0.043  0.058  0.113* 
  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.039)  (0.046)  (0.059) 
Control minus Ownership  -0.981**  -0.993**  -0.992**  -1.030**  -0.996** 
  (0.445)  (0.447)  (0.425)  (0.453)  (0.447) 
Financial investor dummy  0.327*  0.376**  0.345**  0.326*  0.332* 
  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.165)  (0.174)  (0.172) 
US cross-listing dummy  0.368**  0.422**  0.357**  0.331*  0.380** 
  (0.175)  (0.171)  (0.172)  (0.180)  (0.174) 
No. of observations  1841  1841  2233  1838  1841 
Pseudo-R
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Table VI 
Ex-ante determinants of the unification (averages) 
The effect of the variables listed on the probability to unify dual-class shares is estimated by a probit model:  
Prob(Unifyi=1) = F(X ia)  
where Unifyi is a variable that equals 1 if company i switched to a single-class share system in period 1996-2002 and 0 if 
it remained dual-class in this period, F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable, a is a vector 
of coefficients, and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables (listed in the first column) observed for firm i. The estimation 
method is maximum likelihood. In this specification, the focus is on cross-sectional variation between the main sample of 
firms. AT LEAST ONE EQUITY ISSUE, DUMMY is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has had at least 
one new equity issue in period 1996-2002. EQUITY ISSUE (ADJUSTED) DUMMY,  EQUITY ISSUE PROCEEDS/ 
EQUITY, and ACQUISITIONS/ SIZE are averaged over 1996-2002. SIZE and INDUSTRY MTB are averaged over 1994 
to 2001 for control group, and over two years prior to the unification for the event group. Detailed definitions for the 
variables are provided in Appendix B. The regressions also include a constant term, and country dummies (not reported). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
At least one equity issue, dummy   0.625***         
  (0.172)         
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy (average)    0.876***      0.842*** 
    (0.320)      (0.321) 
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity (average)      0.359*     
      (0.198)     
Acquisitions/ Size (average)        0.767  0.590 
        (0.566)  (0.575) 
Size (average)  -0.005  0.016  0.041  0.024  -0.016 
  (0.093)  (0.095)  (0.105)  (0.1)  (0.102) 
Industry MTB (average)  0.280***  0.261***  0.269***  0.255***  0.252*** 
  (0.082)  (0.080)  (0.084)  (0.080)  (0.081) 
Control minus Ownership  -1.489**  -1.522**  -1.687***  -1.593***  -1.521** 
  (0.615)  (0.606)  (0.623)  (0.604)  (0.608) 
Financial investor dummy  0.380  0.439*  0.539**  0.478*  0.449* 
  (0.25)  (0.253)  (0.262)  (0.251)  (0.251) 
US cross-listing dummy  0.360  0.311  0.461*  0.382  0.265 
  (0.249)  (0.259)  (0.252)  (0.255)  (0.262) 
No. of observations  378  378  352  378  378 
Pseudo-R
2  0.179  0.163  0.157  0.150  0.166 
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Table VII 
Comparison of variables: event firms vs. matching control firms 
The table reports mean ratios for 101 event firms which unified their shares in 1996-2002. Matching control firms are chosen by 
matching each event firm with a dual-class firm using the following algorithm. All 493 event and control firms are divided into 108 
groups:12 industry groups (as defined by Campbell (1996)) times 3 size categories times 3 market-to-book (MTB) categories. 
Size and MTB categories are High (75
th percentile and upward), Medium (25
th to 75
th percentile), and Low (25
th percentile and 
downward). If there are more than one dual-class firm in the same group, the firm with the closest MTB is chosen. If there is no 
matching firms in the same group (there are 3 such cases), the firm from the same industry with the closest MTB ratio from the 
next closest size category is taken. T-Statistics and (two-sided) significance levels of testing the equality of means between the 
event group and the matched control group are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. Appendix B provides definitions for the variables. 
Panel A: Ex-ante effects 
  Event group means  Control group means  T-Statistic 
Year relative to unification  -3  -2  -1  -3  -2  -1  -3  -2  -1 
Industry MTB  3.17  3.43  3.34  3.19  3.28  3.21  -0.11  0.76  0.63 
MTB  2.80  3.11  3.03  2.45  2.54  2.41  0.97  1.39  1.41 
Industry adjusted MTB  -0.49  -0.43  -0.56  -0.77  -0.76  -0.80  0.80  0.89  0.63 
Size  5.58  5.58  5.62  5.56  5.48  5.47  0.13  0.78  1.17 
ROA  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.06  -1.30  -0.82  0.62 
ROE  0.10  0.09  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  -0.79  -1.13  -0.21 
Leverage  0.27  0.26  0.25  0.27  0.25  0.24  0.22  0.50  0.52 
CAPEX  0.32  0.35  0.31  0.34  0.34  0.30  -0.17  0.13  0.05 
Cash flow/ Assets  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07  -0.56  -0.99  -0.26 
Cash balance/ Assets  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.08  -0.29  1.34 
Cash dividends/ Assets  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  -2.35**  -1.53  -1.93* 
Sales growth  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.14  0.12  0.11  -0.88  -0.50  -0.09 
Voting premium  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.17  0.16  0.19  -1.86*  -1.75*  -2.68*** 
Voting premium (no pref. dividend)  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  -0.59  -0.09  0.23 
Equity issue dummy  0.30  0.28  0.30  0.25  0.27  0.21  0.60  0.15  1.40 
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy  0.21  0.22  0.26  0.17  0.22  0.18  0.72  0.00  1.36 
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  0.09  0.09  0.16  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.77  1.34  1.72* 
Acquisitions/ Size  0.14  0.11  0.13  0.07  0.09  0.11  1.82*  0.50  0.64 
    Mean  Obs.    Mean  Obs.    T-Statistic   
US cross-listing dummy    0.18  101    0.12  101    1.19   
Both shares listed dummy    0.63  100    0.65  99    -0.24   
Dividend dummy    0.53  88    0.31  78    3.02***   
Control    0.40  91    0.40  81    -0.20   
Ownership    0.26  78    0.23  81    1.07   
Control minus Ownership    0.12  77    0.18  81    -2.98***   
Control exceeds Ownership, high    0.29  77    0.63  81    -4.59***   
Family owner dummy    0.39  92    0.42  81    -0.38   
Financial investor dummy    0.17  92    0.17  81    0.02   
 Panel B: Ex-post effects 
  Event group means  Control group means  T-Statistic 
Year relative to unification  0  +1  +2  +3  0  +1  +2  +3  0  +1  +2  +3 
Industry MTB  3.00  2.76  2.69  2.83  3.00  2.95  2.76  2.67  0.01  -0.80  -0.36  0.53 
MTB  3.08  3.40  2.86  2.77  2.58  2.40  2.29  1.88  0.89  1.67*  1.21  2.06** 
Industry adjusted MTB  -0.04  0.42  0.05  -0.07  -0.45  -0.64  -0.61  -0.79  0.79  2.01**  1.35  1.48 
Size  5.64  5.62  5.62  5.64  5.50  5.43  5.49  5.60  1.09  1.34  0.83  0.23 
ROA  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.06  -0.41  -0.34  -0.42  -0.29 
ROE  0.09  0.06  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.09  0.10  0.11  -0.52  -0.54  -0.22  -0.07 
Leverage  0.26  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.25  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.17  -1.78*  -1.73*  -1.11 
CAPEX  0.32  0.30  0.36  0.24  0.29  0.24  0.33  0.27  0.47  0.97  0.25  -0.37 
Cash flow/ Assets  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.08  -0.09  0.36  0.68  -0.70 
Cash balance/ Assets  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.10  1.55  0.77  1.35  1.05 
Cash dividends/ Assets  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  -1.38  -0.65  0.57  0.55 
Sales growth  0.09  0.11  0.14  0.11  0.08  0.09  0.15  0.18  0.37  0.51  -0.15  -1.00 
Equity issue dummy  0.36  0.24  0.23  0.26  0.19  0.13  0.18  0.24  2.66***  1.74*  0.62  0.20 
Equity issue (adjusted) dummy  0.32  0.19  0.18  0.22  0.16  0.11  0.15  0.20  2.68***  1.46  0.46  0.26 
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  0.15  0.05  0.13  0.01  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.01  2.04**  -0.14  0.70  -0.69 
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Table VIII 
Ex-post effects of the unification 
For each of the variables listed the following specification is estimated:  
yit=a+UNIt+UNIt-1+UNIt-2+UNIt-3+ui+dt+eit, 
where ui and dt are respectively a firm-specific and calendar year-specific effect, UNIt-j are dummy variables equal to 
one if year t-j was the year of the unification. By using a fixed effect model each company before the unification is used 
as a control for itself after the unification. The table only reports the coefficients on the unification and post-unification 
dummy variables. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The second to last column reports the p-value of 
the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of Year-1 and Year-2 dummies are equal to zero. The last column 
reports the p-value of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of all the three post-unification dummies is equal 
to zero. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Appendix B provides definitions for 
the variables. 
 




MTB  0.252  0.034  -0.146  -0.420  0.807  0.776 
  (0.335)  (0.359)  (0.399)  (0.423)     
Industry adjusted MTB  0.632**  0.843**  0.473  -0.328  0.031  0.258 
  (0.318)  (0.340)  (0.379)  (0.402)     
Size  0.015  0.028  -0.016  0.031  0.977  0.909 
  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.033)     
ROA  0.010  -0.006  0.005  -0.010  0.901  0.669 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.018)     
ROE  -0.010  -0.049  -0.024  -0.008  0.295  0.513 
  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.044)  (0.046)     
Leverage  0.000  -0.031**  -0.034**  0.011  0.009  0.033 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016)     
CAPEX  0.053  0.019  0.115  0.000  0.265  0.438 
  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.074)  (0.079)     
Cash flow/ Assets  0.001  0.008  0.006  0.002  0.472  0.566 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)     
Cash balance/ Assets  0.009  0.011  0.003  -0.005  0.485  0.742 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)     
Cash dividends/ Assets  -0.004  0.003  0.006*  0.001  0.108  0.182 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)     
Sales growth  0.046  0.082*  0.079  0.085*  0.040  0.027 
  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.052)     
Equity issue proceeds/ Equity  0.017  -0.067  0.035  -0.095  0.619  0.211 
  (0.039)  (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.048)     
Acquisitions/ Size  0.069**  0.043  0.026  -0.003  0.212  0.399 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.036)     
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Table IX 
Ownership changes after the unification 
The table shows the ownership dynamics for 71 firm that unified the dual-class shares in 1996-2002. Panel A presents 
a summary of the changes in the largest shareholder’s voting power after the unification. The largest shareholder is 
defined as the shareholder with the highest number of votes before the unification. Panel B shows the average (and 
median) change in the largest shareholder’s voting power after the unification.  
Panel A 
Largest shareholder's (by votes, before unification) action:  Number of firms  Percent of firms 
Keep or acquire majority control (more than 50% of votes)  13  18.3% 
Lose majority control, but keep a block (more than 10% of votes)  4  5.6% 
Lose majority control completely (less than 10% of votes)  6  8.5% 
Keep control in 10%-50% range (before and after)  30  42.3% 
Lose a block from 10%-50% range to less than 10% of votes  14  19.7% 
Dispersed, less than 10% of votes (before and after)  4  5.6% 
  71  100.0% 
Panel B 
  Mean  Median 
Largest shareholder’s fraction of votes before unification, %  38.7  34.1 
Largest shareholder’s fraction of equity before unification, %  25.0  19.1 
Largest shareholder’s fraction of votes and equity after unification, %  22.8  21.3 
     
Largest shareholder’s change in votes (after minus before), %  -15.9  -12.8 
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1 Throughout the paper, dual-class shares means that the firm has more than one share class (except 
American Depository Receipts) with different voting rights. There can be more than two share classes, but 
all the analysis can be easily generalized to such cases. 
2 Examples of such benefits are the power to elect the board members and the CEO, the power to build 
business empires, the ability to consume perquisites at the expense of the firm, and the ability to transfer 
assets to private corporate entities. Alternatively, Holmen and Högfeldt (2003) claim that in Sweden private 
benefits of control are arising from status, prestige, and social recognition, which are not value destroying. 
July 7, 1986).  
4 In a rights offering, current shareholders are given short-term options, “rights”, to purchase new shares on 
5 One should note that dual-class shares is just one of the ways to create separation between ownership and 
control. There are also pyramids and cross-holdings (Bebchuk et al. (2000)). However, dual-class shares is 
the most common method in Europe. From Faccio and Lang (2002) data set we can estimate that on 
average 32% of firms in the seven countries used in this study have dual-class shares, compared with 20% 
of firms using pyramids, and 2% cross-holdings. 
6 This difference in market values is found also in my sample, see Section III. 
7 Excluding these firms from my sample does not change the results. 
8 There are exceptions, however. In Swedish company Ericsson, the talks on the issue of the compensation 
for high voting shareholders have taken nearly two years, and have seriously hindered the acceptance of the 
reform that would cut the difference in voting rights on high and low voting shares from 1,000-to-one to 
10-to-one (Financial Times, February 19, 2004). 
9 There is, however, a countervailing argument by Siegel (2003), who suggests that cross-listing in the U.S. 
is a reputational bonding rather than a legal bonding. When it comes to implementation, American 
governance rules affecting U.S. listed foreign firms are much stricter in formal writing than in practice. 
10 This argument is closely related to Demers and Lewellen (2003) who find that there are marketing 
benefits associated with IPO under-pricing. 
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 See “Big Board Agrees to Let Companies List More Than One Class of Stock”, The Wall Street Journal, 
3
a pro rata basis, at a certain exercise price, until a certain expiration date.  
                                                                                                                                                 
11 This is due to lack of data. Collecting past ownership data for 493 firms from 7 countries over 7 years is 
not very feasible.  
12 This variable has been used previously by Claessens et al. (2002). 
13 The SIC codes are combined into 12 larger industry groups following Campbell (1996): Basic industry 
(SIC 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33), Capital goods (SIC 34-35, 38), Construction (SIC 15-17, 32, 52), 
Consumer durables (SIC 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 55, 57), Financial/ real estate (excluding banks) (SIC 62-
69), Food and tobacco (SIC 1, 20, 21, 54), Leisure (SIC 27, 58, 70, 78-79), Petroleum (SIC 13, 29), 
Services (SIC 72-73, 75-76, 80, 82, 87, 89), Textiles and trade (SIC 22-23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59), 
Transportation (SIC 40-42, 44-45, 47), and Utilities (SIC 46, 48, 49). 
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